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Maintaining the criminal prohibition of abortion as a means  
of protecting women
Alternative facts and realities in reproductive law and policy
Samantha Halliday
In England and Wales we recently celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Abortion Act 1967, an Act described as a “great gift of choice from that Parlia-
ment  to the women of Britain”1 As I will demonstrate in this chapter, there is 
nothing about the Abortion Act that justifies such a label, rather than facilitat-
ing women’s choices, it entrenches medical dominance, rendering women sup-
plicants, able only to request an abortion whilst preserving the gate-keeping 
function of the medical profession. Profound differences characterise the law 
regulating abortion in the United States of America, Germany and England & 
Wales, but one fact unites them all – none should be taken at face value, in each 
case the rhetoric does not match the regulatory reality it claims to describe! The 
English Abortion Act purports to regulate abortion strictly, but renders early 
abortion a matter of medical discretion and is generously funded by the Nation-
al Health Service. The German provisions (§  218ff StGB) require that pro-life 
counselling give voice to the “unborn’s” right to life and to assist women to 
make “a responsible decision” whilst designating non-indicated abortions as 
unlawful, yet abortion is available upon demand within the first 12 weeks of 
pregnancy and often funded by social insurance.2 By contrast, in the USA the 
Supreme Court recognised that the right to autonomy encompasses a right to 
elect a pre-viability abortion,3 yet women struggle to access abortion with 
dwindling numbers of providers, onerous provisions designed to impede access 
to abortion and high costs in many states. It is suggested that the regulation of 
abortion is an area like no other in the way that it demonstrates the gap between 
regulatory reality and the rhetoric that accompanies it. 
1 C. McCafferty MP, HC Deb 31 October 2006, vol 451, col 157.
2 M. Spieker, Kirche und Abtreibung in Deutschland: Ursachen und Verlauf eines Konflik-
tes (2d ed. 2008), at 105, suggests around 80 % of all counselling based abortions are paid for 
by the state.
3 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania et al. v Casey 505 U.S.  833 (1992).
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In my previous work I have argued that there is a need to reframe the abortion 
debate around the principle of human dignity, recognising the need for the law 
to acknowledge a woman’s dignity interest in terms of exercising autonomy 
through her reproductive choices and her bodily integrity, whilst also recognis-
ing that the law may require such choices to be informed and may even seek to 
promote birth, rather than adoption, recognising the inherent value of human 
life.4 In this chapter I address the related issue of rhetoric and the way in which 
it is utilised to promote abortion exceptionalism, constructing abortion as a 
crime, rather than treating it like any other medical procedure, as a private mat-
ter. Rhetoric that increasingly frames the crime as necessary to protect women, 
from themselves, from abusive partners, or even from doctors. The gap between 
the rhetoric and the regulatory reality is interrogated through the lens of early 
medical abortion, demonstrating the poor fit of the criminal law in this context, 
where it has been unable to respond adequately to developments in medical 
 science, employing empty rhetoric about protecting women to mandate the use 
of the “strong arm of the law” whilst impeding access to early medical abortion 
(EMA) and rendering women more likely to resort to unofficial sources of 
abortion.5 
I. The Law relating to abortion in England and Wales6
The current law relating to abortion in England and Wales can be found in the 
Abortion Act 1967 (as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990) which provides defences to doctors performing abortions in certain 
circumstances to the crime of procuring a miscarriage (Offences Against the 
Person Act 18617 (OAPA)) and the crime of child destruction (Infant Life (Pres-
ervation) Act 1929). The current prohibition of abortion is found in a Victorian 
statute passed more than 150 years ago in a time very different to our own, a 
time when women could not own property,8 still less determine what should 
happen to the content of their uterus. Reflecting that the first statutory prohibi-
tion of abortion was introduced in 1803,9 Mumby J emphasised that “The world 
of 1803 or even of 1861 was very different from our own. A society which could 
4 S. Halliday, Protecting Human Dignity: Reframing the Abortion Debate to Respect the 
Dignity of Choice and Life, (2016) 13 CIL 287.
5 Throughout this chapter my focus will be upon the law in England and Wales, but rele-
vant comparisons with the law from Germany and the USA will be drawn as space allows.
6 The Abortion Act 1967 does not extend to Northern Ireland, where there are no statuto-
ry defences to the crimes of procuring a miscarriage Offences Against the Persons Act 1861.
7 The OAPA does not extend to Scotland.
8 21 years later the Married Women‘s Property Act 1882 45 & 46 Vict. c.75 recognised a 
married woman’s right to own property.
9 43 Geo.3 c.53. Lord Ellenborough’s Act categorised all abortions, regardless of whether 
107Maintaining the criminal prohibition of abortion as a means of protecting women
believe that the pillory and the gallows were appropriate punishments for abor-
tion is so utterly alien to our own as to make it almost impossible to bridge the 
gulf of incomprehension. Even in 1861 our society was only on the brink of the 
beginnings of the modern world.” Nevertheless, the 1861 Act is still the current 
law and equates to §  218 StGB, prohibiting all abortion. 
Sections 58, 59 OAPA set out three offences: that of a pregnant woman inten-
tionally procuring her own miscarriage (unlawfully using “poison or other 
noxious thing, an instrument, or other means”); that of a third party intending 
to unlawfully procure a miscarriage (whether or not the woman was pregnant); 
and the offence of supplying, or procuring the means to be used to unlawfully 
procure a miscarriage. Thus the OAPA provides a comprehensive prohibition of 
abortion, with no explicit exception for therapeutic abortion, despite the fact 
that 15 years previously the criminal law commissioners had proposed an ex-
ception where a miscarriage were procured in good faith to save the life as the 
mother.10 Nevertheless, the OAPA retained the word “unlawfully” in setting 
out the offences, a word that the courts would later interpret to mean that abor-
tion must be lawful (justified) in some circumstances. 
Unlike the OAPA, the 1929 Infant Life Preservation Act (ILPA) includes an 
express exception to the offence of child destruction where necessary to save the 
life of the woman. This legislation was enacted to protect the “child” in the 
process of being born as the OAPA protects the foetus inside the woman’s uter-
us, whilst the common law offence of murder only applies to those already born 
alive, leaving the foetus in the process of being born unprotected. Creating the 
offence of child destruction, the Act recognises that the offence would not be 
committed where, acting in good faith, the act was done with the aim of saving 
the woman’s life, s.1(1) ILPA. In 1927, the Reichsgericht recognised a therapeutic 
exception to §  218ff RStGB, recognising that a justification would apply, per-
mitting the termination of pregnancy, where it was the only way to avert a 
threat to a pregnant woman’s life, or the danger of serious injury to health.11 The 
same conclusion was reached by MacNaughten J in R v Bourne where he held 
that the word “unlawfully” in ss. 58, 59 was not meaningless and that the scope 
of lawful abortion should be equated with the scope of lawful child destruction, 
that is where necessary to save the woman’s life or health, 12 although he was 
careful to stress that such a justification would only be available to a medical 
professional acting in good faith. 
or not the foetus had quickened, as crimes, and elevated the status of the abortion of a quick-
ened foetus to a felony, rendering abortion a capital offence for the first time in English Law.
10 Second report of Her Majesty’s Commissioners Revising and Consolidating the Crimi-
nal Law, Parliamentary Papers (1846) 24, 42.
11 RG 11/3/1927 RGSt, vol 61 at 242–56.
12 R v Bourne [1939] 1 K.B. 687, at 691.
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Thus the basic position in English law is that abortion is prohibited, punish-
able by up to life imprisonment under both the OAPA and the ILPA. Whilst in 
Germany, during the 1920s, there was significant support for abortion reform 
on the left, a similar campaign never took place in England where the “recurring 
figure in this landscape was the working-class mother, who had to be both sup-
ported and disciplined for the good of the nation.”13 This view of women dom-
inated the narrative during the passage of the Abortion Act 1967, an Act that 
sets out exceptions to the offences under the OAPA and ILPA, adopting a med-
ical framework that “[recast] the social problem of unwanted pregnancy as a 
public health question.”14
II. A medical model without engagement with human rights
The Abortion Act 1967 adopts an indication-based model of abortion regula-
tion. In its current form it provides four indications, each of which will exclude 
liability under the law relating to abortion if two doctors determine in good 
faith that the indication is met and the abortion is performed by a registered 
medical practitioner in an approved place. The first indication is a social indica-
tion framed as a medical indication, permitting abortion where “the pregnancy 
has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance of the preg-
nancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of 
injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing 
children of her family”. The safety of abortion and the risks inherent in any 
pregnancy mean that it will always be safer to terminate a pregnancy than to 
continue it during the first trimester, rendering this a very liberal indication that 
accounts for 98 % of all abortions performed in England and Wales.15 The re-
maining 2 % of abortions are performed on the basis of the embryopathic indi-
cation (s.1(1)(d) Abortion Act), with very few abortions performed on the true 
medical indications – risk to the woman’s life, or to prevent grave permanent 
injury to her health (s.1(1)(c) and (b) Abortion Act respectively.)
In his poem Annus Mirabilis Philip Larkin tells us “Sexual intercourse began 
/ In 1963.” The 1960s were undoubtedly a time of great social and political 
change. However, the Abortion Act is not part of the sexual liberation move-
ment, it does not empower women to demand abortion, rather it places abortion 
firmly within a medicalised framework, defining acceptable grounds for abor-
13 S. Brooke, “A New World for Women?” Abortion Law Reform in Britain during the 
1930s, (2001) 106 The American Historical Review 431, at 434.
14 S. Sheldon, The Medical Framework and Early Medical Abortion in the U.K.: How Can 
a State Control Swallowing?, in: Abortion Law in Transnational Perspective: Cases and Con-
troversies, R. J.Cook et al. (eds), 2014, UPennsylvania Press, at 194.
15 Department of Health and Social Care, Abortion Statistics, England and Wales: 2017, 2018.
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tion in medical terms and devolving the issue to the medical profession. In doing 
so it builds upon the common law and the distinction emphasised by Mac-
naughten J in his direction to the jury in Bourne, between a medical profession-
al, a skilled man, performing an abortion free of charge and in the belief that “he 
ought, in the performance of his duty as a member of a profession devoted to the 
alleviation of human suffering, to do it,” and the abortionist, “a woman without 
any medical skill or medical qualifications” who performed the same act for 
money.16 It is the medical approval of the woman’s request that legitimises it. 
Whilst medical expertise is undoubtedly desirable in relation to the perfor-
mance of an abortion, it is difficult to understand how medical training and 
expertise equips healthcare professionals to determine whether an abortion is 
permissible. Yet the rhetoric of expertise ignores the broader social context in 
which such decisions are made and obscures the fact that most abortions are 
based on social grounds, rather than medical necessity. 
Whilst abortion is the second most commonly performed gynaecological 
procedure, the Act recognises neither a woman’s right to choose abortion, nor a 
foetal right to life, instead it characterises abortion as a medical decision, ena-
bling doctors to perform an abortion on the basis of a (socio-)medical indication 
(to protect the woman’s health or life) or an embryopathic indication (where 
there is a substantial risk that the child, if born will suffer from a serious hand-
icap.) In this way, the Abortion Act foregrounds medical authority, rather than 
human rights, devolving abortion decisions to the medical profession. Provided 
that the medical profession take a liberal stance, access to abortion will remain 
easy, but women’s reproductive freedom is fragile, it depends upon doctors be-
nevolently keeping the gates open rather than upon a recognition of their right 
to control their own bodies; the right to autonomy is rendered irrelevant under 
the medical model adopted by the Act. As McLean has argued, “The liberty to 
decide may or may not in fact result in a truly free choice, but it is certain that a 
free choice will never be possible unless reproductive liberty (including the right 
to terminate pregnancies) is seen as an issue which transcends clinical ‘facts’ and 
medical capacities and becomes focussed on the real issue – namely women’s 
freedom from the biological lottery.”17
A fundamental distinction between England & Wales on the one side and 
Germany and the USA on the other, is the site where the battle for abortion has 
been fought. In England and Wales, the courts have been involved only on the 
periphery, considering questions of conscientious objection,18 the categorisa-
tion of a nurse’s role in terminating pregnancy,19 a man’s inability to veto a 
16 N 12, at 689–690.
17 S. McLean, Old Law, New Medicine, London, 1999, at 83.
18 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan & Another [2014] UKSC 68.
19 Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social 
Security [1981] AC 800.
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woman’s abortion,20 and most recently a case concerning the regulation of abor-
tion in Northern Ireland. In the latter the Supreme Court was asked to rule on 
a challenge to the compatibility of the law in Northern Ireland (OAPA as inter-
preted in Bourne) with Articles 3, 8 and 14 ECHR because that law prohibits 
abortion in cases of serious malformation of the foetus, pregnancies resulting 
from rape, or incest. The majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal 
holding that the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission lacked standing 
to bring these proceedings and so that the court did not have jurisdiction to 
make a declaration of incompatibility in this case. Nevertheless, the majority 
did conclude that the challenged law was incompatible with Article 8, the right 
to privacy.21 The Abortion Act itself has not been challenged, there is no mech-
anism for a review of its constitutionality. By contrast the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht and the US Supreme Court have been able to shape abortion regulation 
through the review of legislation, in doing so they have been able to shift the 
focus from the protection of the woman and criminalisation, to constitutional 
matters, what Siegel has termed the constitutionalisation of abortion.22 This 
permits the courts to consider the role of the state, the rights of the woman and 
the protection afforded to the foetus. 
The Abortion Act stands out within Europe for adopting an entirely medical 
model of abortion regulation and failing to engage with the rights and interests 
of either the woman or the foetus. The German law relating to abortion is much 
more rights-orientated although it also starts from the position that abortion is 
prohibited, §  218 StGB. Like the Abortion Act, §  218a StGB sets out specific 
indications that will justify abortion – the medical (§  218a II) and criminological 
(§  218a III) indications. In so doing both enactments underline the fact that 
abortion is exceptional, rather than being based upon the woman’s right to au-
tonomy. The Bundesverfassungsgericht made it clear that although there is a 
duty to continue a pregnancy to full term, it would not be reasonable to expect 
a woman to continue a pregnancy where her life, or health were at risk, or where 
she was pregnant as a result of rape. In such circumstances an abortion would be 
justified and thus classified as not unlawful,23 but the court emphasised that 
medical oversight would be required, that the question of whether the pregnant 
woman could reasonably be expected to continue the pregnancy is not a ques-
tion for the woman herself, instead a neutral, objective arbiter (a doctor) should 
determine whether or not an indication exists that would permit the woman to 
choose a termination of pregnancy.24 Therefore, the court emphasised that 
20 Paton v. British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees and Another [1978] QB 276.
21 Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland: Abortion) (Rev 1) 
[2018] UKSC 27.
22 R. Siegel, The Constitutionalization of Abortion, in: Transnational Perspective n 14.
23 BVerfGE 39, 1, at 48; BVerfGE 88, 203, at 257.
24 BVerfGE 88, 203, at 255.
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abortion cannot be justified on the basis of a woman’s autonomous choice to 
terminate her pregnancy. Instead, it is the unreasonable expectation, as verified 
by a third party, that can justify the woman’s failure to continue the pregnancy 
to full term. Thus just as in England and Wales, medical expertise is deployed to 
legitimise the woman’s decision, but also to underline that abortion is an excep-
tional choice that is not legitimised by a woman’s right to autonomy. In both 
jurisdictions the law creates the notion of a worthy abortion, or at least an abor-
tion that is not unworthy. 
Although the Bundesverfassungsgericht recognised that the pregnant woman’s 
rights to life and bodily integrity, to personality and her dignity are engaged, it 
held that she owes a duty to her foetus throughout pregnancy, a duty to continue 
the pregnancy to full term.25 That being the case, her rights must be curtailed to 
the extent necessary to protect the foetus, unless her choice to terminate the preg-
nancy can be justified. As the court stressed, in all but the most serious situations 
a woman’s failure to continue the pregnancy will not be capable of justification 
and thus must be categorised as unlawful.26 However, it also held that absent a 
justificatory indication, a woman could elect to terminate the pregnancy during 
the first 12 weeks, provided that she undergoes counselling designed to encourage 
women to continue their pregnancies. The court recognised that the state has an 
affirmative duty to protect foetal life that requires it to refrain from direct inter-
ference with prenatal life, but also requires the state to protect the foetus from 
third parties, including the pregnant woman herself.27 It held that the state could 
provide the requisite minimum of protection of foetal life by requiring that the 
woman undergo pro-life counselling, by providing support (such as child care 
facilities) for bringing up children, and by continuing to designate non-justified 
abortion as unlawful (but not punishable) throughout pregnancy. In relation to 
the woman’s rights, the court found that such counselling (which would not re-
quire the counsellor to approve the woman’s reasons for wanting a termination) 
would comply with the duty to respect the woman’s dignity.28 
The counselling now enshrined in §  219 StGB forms an integral part of the 
protection of foetal life and is compulsory in the case of all abortions that cannot 
be justified by either the medical or the criminological indication (§  218a II, III 
StGB).29 Designated as “pregnancy conflict counselling” the normative goal of 
the counselling is to encourage women to continue their pregnancy. The quid pro 
quo is that a woman can exercise her right to self-determination and elect an 
25 BVerfGE 39, 1, at 44; 88, 203, at 253.
26 BVerfGE 39, 1, at 48ff; 88, 203, at 255 ff.
27 BVerfGE 39, 1, at 42; 88, 203, at 255.
28 BVerfGE 88, 203, at 265 ff.
29 The court did recognise that an embryopathically indicated abortion could be justified, 
but that indication has been subsumed within the medical indication, §  218a II StGB by taking 
account of the woman’s current and future circumstances.
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abortion without requiring the approval of any other individual (including a 
doctor) within twelve weeks, provided that she undergoes the mandatory coun-
selling and at least three days pass between the counselling and the performance 
of the abortion, (§  218a I StGB). The counselling is designed to assist her to reach 
a “responsible and conscientious” decision about terminating the pregnancy. 
§  219 StGB validates a portrait of women as irresponsible, incompetent deci-
sion-makers, people who require assistance to make a responsible and conscien-
tious decisions. Like her counterpart in England she is constructed as selfish, 
deviant, as unable to decide for herself, but unlike her counterpart, the woman in 
Germany who completes the required counselling is able to elect an abortion 
without having to gain a third party’s approval, the doctor is required only to 
ensure that a certificate has been obtained and the cooling off period has passed.
The construction of women as incapable and vulnerable underlies both the 
German and the English regulation of abortion, firstly the regulation constructs 
women seeking an abortion as deviant, as aberrant, as failing to fulfil their nat-
ural role of mother. Women’s agency is denied – in the case of England and 
Wales, absent an emergency situation, 2 doctors are required to confirm that the 
indication is met, determining that an abortion is permissible in the circum-
stances. In Germany a woman must undergo counselling to enable them to 
make a responsible decision. Reviewing the operation of the Abortion Act, the 
Lane Committee determined “It is in the interests of the patient as an individu-
al that the abortion decision be taken by doctors,” noting that “Some women 
would find the burden of making their own decision unsupported a heavy 
one.”30 More recently the Science and Technology Committee considered the 
requirement that two doctors certify an indication is met does not “safeguard 
women or doctors in any meaningful way, or [serve] any other useful pur-
pose.”31 It recommended the removal of the requirement for two signatures (al-
though it did not recommend that there is no need for certification at all), yet 
almost ten years later it persists. 
In both jurisdictions women are treated as incapable, able to decide to contin-
ue a pregnancy without outside intervention, but unfit, or unable to decide to 
terminate a pregnancy without external assistance and validation. The require-
ment that doctors are required to grant their permission, or that a counsellor 
must assist a woman to consider all the options, providing the relevant informa-
tion to make a conscientious decision, merely perpetuates the notion that wom-
en are incapable of making a decision for herself, it discriminates against wom-
en, stigmatising them and labelling them as incapable whilst professional 
judgement is preserved and prioritised. 
30 Report of the Committee on the Working of the Abortion Act, Cmnd, 5579, 1974 at [190].
31 Science and Technology Committee Scientific Developments Relating to the Abortion 
Act 1967 (HC 2006– 07, 1045 –I), at [99].
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III. Alternative facts/contested information and  
the demonization of doctors32
The narrative of abortion as crisis continues to dominate discussions of the reg-
ulation of abortion in both Germany and the UK. The counselling mandated by 
§  219 StGB is described in the criminal code as counselling for women in an 
emergency or conflict situation; it is to be delivered by a pregnancy conflict 
counselling centre and the finer details are set out in the Pregnancy Conflict Act 
(Schwangerschaftskonfliktgesetz) 1992. This framing of abortion counselling 
emphasises the aberrant nature of abortion and reinforces the narrative of abor-
tion as crisis. The very premise of §  219 StGB is that women require counselling 
in order to be able to make “a responsible and conscientious decision”. Similarly, 
analysing the parliamentary debates at Westminster, Sheldon identified two 
constructions of women: the “emotionally weak, unstable (even suicidal) victim 
of her desperate social circumstances” and the “selfish, irrational child.” She 
argues that only “3 images of femininity […] [are] presented in the debates: the 
woman as minor, as victim and as mother.”33 In each case it was argued that she 
was unable, or unfit to elect an abortion alone. 
The same narrative of abortion as crisis continues to dominate current de-
bates about abortion, from the so called “advertising ban” contained in §  219a 
StGB that prevents doctors from providing information about abortion services 
they provide on their website, to calls to maintain the criminal prohibition of 
abortion in both jurisdictions. Traditionally opposition to abortion has been 
expressed from a foeto-centric perspective, however a perceptible rhetorical 
shift in the contours of the debate has occurred, shifting the focus from protect-
ing the foetus, to women-protective justifications for restricting abortion. The 
anti-choice rhetoric of protecting women is well illustrated by the “both lives 
matter” campaign, a play on the “black lives matter” movement that highlights 
the racial dimensions of violence by state actors. However, the movements are 
not the same, whilst black lives matters seeks to build local power, to intervene 
to promote and protect black communities from the state, the movement behind 
“both lives matter” seeks to constrain women’s choices, to subject them to more 
control, to reduce access to abortion. This campaign is part of the so-called 
“neglected rhetorical strategy” promoted by activists such as David Reardon 
that argue an effective anti-choice campaign must focus upon women as well as 
foetuses, that women protective amendments will be accepted by people who do 
not identify as anti-choice. Reardon argues such amendments are not intended 
to prohibit abortion, they are incrementalist in nature and intended to restrict 
32 A detailed analysis of women protective regulation falls outside the scope of this chap-
ter, but can be found in Halliday n 4.
33 S. Sheldon, Beyond Control: Medical Power and Abortion Law, London, 1997, at 35.
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access to abortion, to make it harder, and particularly in the U.S context more 
expensive, to obtain. 34 In this way, as Siegel recognises, the Post Abortion Syn-
drome discourse has been transformed, no longer targeting women in a recruit-
ment drive to swell the ranks of the anti-choice movement, the woman-protec-
tive antiabortion argument seeks to engage with those who are ambivalent about 
restricting abortion, to persuade them to accept abortion restrictions in the 
name of promoting women’s health.35 
A further, related, shift in the rhetoric can be discerned rejecting the the trust 
in doctors that underpins the current regulation of abortion; doctors (or at least 
those who perform abortions) are no longer characterised as a safe pair of hands 
and increasingly calls are being made for women to have a “right to know,” sug-
gesting that doctors conceal information about abortion, taking advantage of, 
rather than protecting, vulnerable women. In Germany, for example, the recent 
campaign to repeal §  219a StGB underlines the perceived lack of trust in the 
medical profession. §  219a StGB was introduced during the Nazi period prohib-
iting publicly offering abortion.36 In 2017 a German doctor was convicted under 
this provision after she listed abortion as service on her website and included 
information about how it is performed, including within her practice.37 This 
does seem to conflate the provision of information with advertising, however, 
giving evidence to the Parliamentary Committee for Law and Consumer Pro-
tection, Andrea Redding38 suggested that information and advertising cannot 
realistically be separated from each other where the information is provided by 
a doctor who also performs abortions.39 A similar allegation has been made in 
the Westminster parliamentary debates, for example Dorries MP argued that 
the proposed mandatory counselling could not provided by the abortion pro-
vider, saying “I wonder why we feel it is appropriate that organisations that take 
£60 million a year of taxpayers’ money and are paid to carry out abortions give 
advice on the procedure. […] If an organisation is paid that much for abortions, 
where is the incentive to reduce them?”40 As Abbott MP so incisively quipped, 
“They imply that those men and women are involved in some sort of grotesque 
piecework. It is almost as though they were paid per abortion.”41 Whilst this 
34 D. C. Reardon, A Defense of the Neglected Rhetorical Strategy (NRS) (2002) 18(2) 
 Ethics Med. at 23.
35 See for example R. B. Siegel The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread 
of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument (2008) 57 Duke Law Journal 1641, at 1688.
36 Gesetz zur Abänderung strafrechtlicher Vorschriften vom 26.05.1933, RGBl. I, at 295.
37 AG Gießen BeckRS 2017, 133800.
38 Director of Donum vitae zur Förderung des Schutzes des menschlichen Lebens e.V. – 
one organisation that provides the counselling mandated by §  219 StGB.
39 A. Redding, Protokoll der 19. Sitzung vom 27.06.18, S.  21. A similar suggestion of self-in-
terest might be levelled at the director of an organisation that provides counselling that suggests 
information about should be provided within the “protective sphere” of counselling (ibid).
40 HC Deb 7 September 2011, vol 532, cols 376–8.
41 Ibid, col 380.
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was a clear attempt to undermine trust in the medical profession, it is suggested 
that derogatory terms such as the “abortion industry”42 and “abortionist” ap-
plied to medical professionals are being used in order to reclaim the political and 
moral aspects of the abortion decision, to argue that the decision to terminate a 
pregnancy cannot be left to doctors to determine in good faith without a signif-
icantly greater degree of external control.43 Dorries MP has argued that the Na-
tional Institute for Clinical Excellence should draw up guidance relating to 
abortion, rather than the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
because its members are “all abortionists.”44 Similarly, in Gonzales v Carhart 
the U.S Supreme Court referred to “abortion doctors” (rather than simply doc-
tors, or even gynaecologists) in holding that “The law need not give abortion 
doctors unfettered choice in the course of their medical practice,”45 a marked 
change in attitude from that prevailing in Roe v Wade where the court stressed 
the importance of maintaining professional autonomy.46 
Therefore two rhetorical shifts are evident in the current debates – firstly the 
need to protect women’s health (mental and physical) and secondly the demoni-
zation of doctors. Both strands of rhetoric are linked by a purported need to 
protect women, but neither is evidence based. One of the key arguments adopt-
ed is that women need to be given full information about abortion and the risks 
in poses to women. The anti-choice movement has dedicated significant time 
and resources to developing a bank of literature investigating whether there 
might be a link between abortion and breast cancer, as well as whether abortion 
is psychologically damaging. Whilst both theories have been debunked at the 
highest levels, the continued re-researching of such links has produced a large 
body of literature that is “premised on and perpetuates the pathologisation of 
abortion.”47 Empirical evidence demonstrates that there is no causal connection 
between abortion and breast cancer, or mental health problems,48 but credence 
42 See for example Caulfield MP, HC Deb 13 March 2017, vol 623, col 30.
43 See for example the comments made by Caulfield MP during the debates emphasising 
that women are victims of abortion, providers are money grabbing and rule breakers, crimi-
nals, ibid. 
44 http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/aug/06/nadine-dorries-abortion-sex-edu 
cation, last accessed 7 August 2019.
45 Gonzales v Carhart 127 S.Ct. 1610, at 1636 (2007).
46 Roe v Wade 410 US 113, at 166 (1973).
47 M. Leask, Constructing Women as Mentally Troubled: The Political and Performative 
Effects of Psychological Studies on Abortion and Mental Health (2014) 28 Women’s Studies 
Journal 74, at 75.
48 See for example, National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health. Induced Abortion 
and Mental Health. A Systematic Review of the Mental Health Outcomes of Induced Abor-
tion, Including their Prevalence and Associated Factors, London: Academy of Medical Royal 
Colleges, 2011; RCOG, The Care of Women Requesting Induced Abortion: Evidence-based 
Clinical Guideline Number 7, 2011, at 42 ff.; American Psychological Association Task Force 
on Mental Health and Abortion, Report of the APA Task Force on Mental Health and Abor-
tion, Washington DC, 2008; Royal College of Psychiatrists Induced Abortion and Mental 
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is given to the “fake” science that promotes the narrative of harm and this is 
relied upon to support restricting access to abortion. This strategy is adopted by 
a number of anti-choice MPs in parliamentary debates in England & Wales and 
Germany, but it has been most effective in the USA where TRAP (targeted reg-
ulation of abortion providers) laws have been used to impose onerous condi-
tions upon clinics providing abortion in order to restrict access to abortion, for 
example by requiring that doctors have admitting privileges, or that abortion 
clinics meet the standards of ambulatory surgical centers.49 Whilst TRAP laws 
setting out professional and building attributes are largely confined to the USA, 
the informed consent paradigm also resonates in Germany and the UK. In 
Casey, outlining its undue burden standard, the U.S. Supreme Court made it 
clear that the woman’s exercise of her autonomy is not unfettered, but may be 
“guided” by the state to ensure that a “responsible” or “wise” decision is made.50 
This echoes the purpose of the mandatory counselling set out in §  219 StGB, to 
assist a woman seeking abortion to reach a “responsible and conscientious” de-
cision about terminating the pregnancy. As Susan Appleton argues, such a 
stance validates “a portrait of women as incompetent decision-makers, depend-
ent on the state to orchestrate their deliberation and provide relevant informa-
tion.”51 Whilst counselling is not mandatory in England and Wales, Dorries MP 
has argued that the current system fails women, that there is a need to protect 
vulnerable women and to ensure that the decision made is fully informed.52 
The purpose, but not the content of the counselling in Germany is prescribed 
by law, by contrast, a number of US states prescribe the information that must 
be given to women. For example the Texas Woman’s Right to Know Act 2003 
requires that women seeking abortion be informed of “the possibility of in-
creased risk of breast cancer following an induced abortion and the natural pro-
tective effect of a completed pregnancy in avoiding breast cancer,”53 despite am-
Health, 2011; C. M. Bräuner et al. “Induced Abortion and Breast Cancer Among Parous 
Women: a Danish Cohort Study” (2013) 92(6) Acta Obstetricia et Gynecologica Scandinavica 
700; World Health Organization Induced abortion does not increase breast cancer risk. Fact 
sheet No.  240, Geneva, WHO 2002; ACOG Committee on Gynecologic Practice, “ACOG 
Committee Opinion No.  434: Induced Abortion and Breast Cancer Risk” (2009) 113 Obstet-
rics & Gynecology at 1417.
49 In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) the US Supreme Court 
held both these requirements to be unconstitutional due to imposing an undue burden upon 
abortion access and noted the “virtual absence of any health benefit”, at 2313.
50 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey (n 3), see for example at 885: 
“The idea that important decisions will be more informed and deliberate if they follow some 
period of reflection does not strike us as unreasonable, particularly where the statute directs 
that important information become part of the background of the decision”.
51 S. F. Appleton, Gender, Abortion and Travel after Roe’s End (2007) 51 St Louis Univer-
sity Law Journal 655, at 661.
52 HC Deb 7 September 2011, vol 532, cols 373.
53 Sec. 171.012. (1)(B)(iii) Texas Health and Safety Code.
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ple evidence that there is no causal link between abortion and breast cancer.54 
Similarly, in the draft minority report to the Science and Technology Commit-
tee’s Report on Scientific Developments Relating to the Abortion Act 1967, it 
was stated “Women should also be informed with regard to the conflicting ex-
pert opinions regarding a link to breast cancer and should be given time to con-
sider the options available – in order to empower women and enable them to 
make a fully informed choice.”55 Thus it would appear that informed consent 
has a rather different meaning in the abortion context to that applicable to other 
medical procedures, requiring more than an accurate understanding of the risks 
and merits of the proposed procedure, indeed it would appear that even hypo-
thetical risks designed to dissuade women from having an abortion should be 
discussed as part of a “right to know”. The inclusion of hypothetical risks was 
considered in Gonzales v Carhart where Kennedy J posited “While we find no 
reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude 
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once creat-
ed and sustained. […] Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.”56 As 
Ginsburg J noted in her stinging dissent, in so doing the court invoked “an an-
tiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly has no reliable evidence.”57 Stud-
ies have demonstrated that women have high levels of decisional certainty about 
their decision to have an abortion,58 yet as part of the parliamentary compro-
mise amending §  219a StGB to permit doctors to refer to the fact that they per-
form abortions, but requiring them to link to official sources of information 
about abortion, rather than provide their own, the German Health Minister 
committed to funding a further study of the psychological effects of abortion. 
The gendered nature of the debate is all too evident, abortion exceptionalism, 
it would appear, requires that women are given additional guidance in order to 
equip them to make a responsible decision that they will not regret, a limitation 
that noticeably does not seem to apply to the decision to continue a pregnancy. 
As the Supreme Court recognised in Whole Woman’s Health, simply saying that 
restrictions are protective of women’s health does not make that the case. It is 
suggested that the time has come to think about the role of the criminal law and 
whether it is best placed to protect women, particularly with the advent of early 
medical abortion (EMA), a form of abortion that requires little to no medical 
involvement and that has changed the context of abortion significantly.
54 See above n 48.
55 Science and Technology Committee (n 31), at 81.
56 Gonzales v Carhart (n 45), at 1634.
57 Ibid, at 1648.
58 See for example L. J. Ralph et al., Measuring Decisional Certainty among Women Seek-
ing Abortion (2017) 95(3) Contraception 269; C. Helfferich, Frauen Leben 3, Familienplanung 
im Lebenslauf von Frauen. Schwerpunkt: Ungewollte Schwangerschaften, Berlin, 2016.
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IV. Early medical abortion
Abortion discourse is dominated by medical paradigms – pregnancy is framed 
as a medical condition, abortion as a medical procedure to be performed by 
medical professionals in a medical setting, but medical abortion has changed 
that. Early medical abortions (EMA) are procured by misoprostol, often used 
in conjunction with mifepristone. Outside the abortion context, misoprostol is 
used to treat gastic ulcers and rheumatoid arthritis. In inducing abortion, it 
works by causing uterine contractions and is usually used after mifepristone, a 
drug that blocks progesterone and softens the cervix. EMA changes the aborti-
on landscape, emphasising the woman’s agency – she is the person who takes the 
pill, the medical professional’s involvement is limited to prescribing it. It also 
challenges the narrative of the doctor as dangerous, the demonising of “aborti-
onists” wielding a scalpel; abortion ceases to be something done to the woman 
(barring instances where she is tricked or abused). EMA presents the oppor-
tunity to refocus, to re-centre the process of abortion upon the woman. There 
is no need for medical involvement, no need to have the abortion away from 
home, no need to convince a doctor, or a counsellor – at least if the woman buys 
the necessary drugs over the internet!59 The impact of this is significant, as Je-
linskaa and Yanowb recognise, “The classic framework of abortion rights ad-
vocacy, where safe equals legal and illegal means unsafe, is turned on its head by 
self-managed medical abortion.”60
Early criminalisation of abortion was based upon the need to protect women, 
to protect their reproductive capacity. At a time when savin or tansy, widely 
regarded as emagogues,61 were used, these were the noxious things targeted by 
s.58 and 59 OAPA. However, the Victorian statute is now being applied to mod-
ern pharmaceuticals, so that a woman purchasing the drugs over the internet, or 
in pharmacies where misoprostol is available over the counter for other condi-
tions, will fall outside the scope of the exceptions to the crime of abortion set 
out in §  218a StGB and the Abortion Act, both of which require the termination 
to be performed by a doctor. The advent of misoprostol has given rise to a “rad-
ical new option of safe, or at least safer, illegal abortion.”62
In circumstances where women have engaged in what might be called abor-
tion enterprise, sourcing the drugs for themselves in order to terminate their 
own pregnancies, they are transformed in the narrative of the criminal law from 
59 See also Sheldon (n 14), at 193.
60 K. Jelinskaa & S. Yanowb, Putting Abortion Pills into Women‘s Hands: Realizing the 
Full Potential of Medical Abortion, (2018) 97 Contraception 86, at 87.
61 See J. M. Riddell Eve’s Herbs, 1997, Harvard University Press.
62 E. Jackson, DIY Abortion and Harm Reduction, in: P. R. Ferguson and G. T. Laurie, 
Inspiring a Medico-Legal Revolution: Essays in Honour of Sheila McLean, 2016, Routledge, 
at 26.
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the status of victim (women to be protected, if necessary from unscrupulous 
abortionists and guided towards a responsible decision), to that of aggressor. 
This characterisation is particularly evident in the sentencing of Sarah Catt. 
Catt had bought misoprostol online after failing to obtain an abortion at two 
clinics due to the late stage of her pregnancy. She had concealed her pregnancy 
and delivered alone at home after taking the drugs. She said that the baby boy 
was stillborn, that she had buried his body, but never said where. At the time she 
took the misoprostol she was almost at full term. Catt was convicted of admin-
istering poison with intent to procure a miscarriage contrary to s. 58 OAPA 
1861. After recounting Catt’s complicated reproductive history of concealing 
pregnancies, having abortions, and giving a child up for adoption, as well as 
giving birth to children she went on to parent together with her partner, the 
judge said that a psychologist’s report would not be necessary. In the circum-
stances this is surprising as such a report would have considered why she had 
behaved in the manner set out. However, Cooke J emphasised that there was no 
mitigation in this case. The maximum sentence under s.58 OAPA 1861 (or for 
the alternative charge under the ILPA) is life imprisonment. Cooke J sentenced 
her to eight years imprisonment, saying “This was a cold calculated decision 
that you took for your own convenience and in your own self-interest alone.”63 
He indulged in some obiter pronouncements about the Abortion Act and gave 
full vent to his feelings in his sentencing remarks saying the “Abortion Act, 
whatever view one takes of its provisions which are, wrongly, liberally con-
strued in practice so as to make abortion available essentially on demand prior 
to 24 weeks with the approval of registered medical practitioners. What you 
have done is to rob an apparently healthy child en ventre sa mere, vulnerable and 
defenceless, of the life which he was about to commence.”64 Continuing “the 
gravamen of this offence is that, at whatever stage life can be said to begin, the 
child in the womb here was so near to birth that in my judgement all right 
thinking people would consider this offence more serious than manslaughter or 
any offence on the calendar other than murder.”65 Cooke J’s intemperate re-
marks are regrettable, they lead to concern about his objectivity; the sentence 
passed was “manifestly excessive” in the view of the Court of Appeal and was 
reduced to 3.5 years.66 Nevertheless, the sentence was still considerably longer 
than that imposed upon Maisha Mohamed, convicted of child destruction (s. 1 
ILPA 1929) after terminating her pregnancy at 7.5 months. She was awarded a 
63 R v Sarah Louise Catt (2012), unreported, 17 September 2012, sentencing remarks avail-
able at: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/sarah-
louise- catt-sentencing-remarks-17092012.pdf, at [7], last accessed 7 August 2019.
64 N 63, at [15].
65 N 63, at [16].
66 R v Sarah Louise Catt [2013] EWCA Crim 1187, at [24].
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1 year suspended sentence.67 The OAPA does not distinguish between early and 
late abortions, but in both of these cases the foetus was viable, making the dif-
ference between the penalties imposed striking. 
A question that British courts have so far failed to consider specifically is 
whether misoprostol constitutes a “poison or other noxious thing” for the pur-
pose of the OAPA. Certainly it is a controlled drug, but it is also used outside 
the abortion context, for example to treat gastric and duodenal ulcers. That 
 suggests that any toxicity must relate to the foetus, but Australian authorities 
suggest that the “noxious thing” must refer to the woman. In R v Brennan & 
Leach68 the defendants were charged with the equivalent of ss. 58 – 9 OAPA, ss. 
225 and 226 Queensland Criminal Code, that Brennan had unlawfully supplied 
Leach with a substance to be used unlawfully to procure her miscarriage and 
that Leach unlawfully administered a noxious thing to herself with intent to 
procure her own miscarriage. Brennan obtained misoprostol and mifepristone 
from Ukraine, after the couple decided against a surgical abortion. Leach was 
about two months pregnant when she took the drugs. In his direction to the 
jury, Everson J stated that whether the pills were noxious must be determined in 
relation to the woman, not to any foetus that may have existed at the time she 
took the drugs. He emphasised that the prosecution’s expert witness had con-
firmed that mifepristone is not harmful to the person taking it, and that Leach 
had not suffered any ill effects from taking the drugs. Similarly in R v Lindner 
it was held that pills needed to entail an appreciable risk of harm to the woman, 
as opposed to the foetus, to constitute poison, or another noxious thing.69 The 
decision in Leach is significant, however there is an important difference be-
tween the English and Australian statutes – a woman can only procure her own 
miscarriage under s.58 OAPA if she is pregnant, whilst s. 255 QCC can be 
committed by the woman whether or not she is pregnant. It would be possible 
to distinguish Leach on this basis. 
As Oberman explains, “For any woman with a smartphone and money, ille-
gal abortion today is far less risk than it was in 1972. That is to say, the risks of 
illegal abortion vary by class, age, education level, geographic location, and 
race.”70 However, it is important to recognise that it is not only women who lack 
access to legal abortion who may want to procure their own abortion. As Aiken 
et al demonstrate in their study, there are a number of reasons why women 
might choose to purchase drugs on the internet, even in a country like Great 
67 R v Mohammed Unreported, Thursday 24 May 2007 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
uknews/1552651/Jury-convicts-mother-who-destroyed-foetus.html, last accessed 7 August 
2019.
68 [2010] QDC 329.
69 [1938] SASR 412, at 413.
70 M. Oberman, Her Body, Our Laws: on the Front Lines of the Abortion War, from El 
Salvador to Oklahoma, Beacon Press, 2018, at 124–5.
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Britain where abortion is accessible and available free on the NHS. They found 
that almost half the women who contacted the online telemedicine initiative 
Women on Web cited access barriers as the reason for contact. These included 
long waiting times, problems caused by having to take time off work for multi-
ple appointments, unavailability of childcare, or simply the distance to the clin-
ic. Just under a third of the women wanted to take the pills at home71 and 18 % 
were struggling to access abortion services due to partner or family control.72 
The Abortion Act does not extend to Northern Ireland and abortion is not 
available there unless there is a threat to the woman’s life or health, applying 
Bourne. Women from Northern Ireland travel to the mainland to access abor-
tion services, now provided free under the NHS, but will generally have to fund 
their own travel and accommodation. The risk of complications from EMA are 
low and the prospect of obtaining the drugs without the need to travel is clearly 
appealing.73 However, the penalties for doing so can be severe. In one case in 
Northern Ireland a young woman ordered drugs on the internet and took them, 
procuring her own miscarriage. She pleaded guilty to administering poison to 
herself to procure a miscarriage (s. 58 OAPA), was convicted and given a three 
months suspended sentence.74 Another woman was prosecuted for helping her 
15-year old daughter to buy pills online (s.59 OAPA) after a doctor from a clin-
ic where she had sought advice reported her to the police.75 That a doctor would 
do such a thing was described more than a hundred years ago as a “monstrous 
cruelty” by Hawkins J,76 that this should occur in a country where there is no 
legal access to abortion in the 21st century, requiring women to travel to access 
services, makes this even more monstrous. 
V. The (mis)use of the criminal law and the need for reform
Abortion remains a crime in the UK, Germany and parts of the USA. The use of 
the criminal law to regulate abortion is symbolic, as Simester and von Hirsch 
argue, “The criminal law has a communicative function which the civil law does 
71 At the time of the study women in England and Wales were required to return to the 
clinic for the second pill which meant that they might start to miscarry whilst travelling 
home.
72 A. Aiken et al., Barriers to Accessing Abortion Services and Perspectives on Using Mife-
pristone and Misoprostol at Home in Great Britain (2018) 97 Contraception 177.
73 I. Platais et al., Prospective Study of Home Use of Mifepristone and Misoprostol for 
Medical Abortion up to 10 Weeks of Pregnancy in Kazakhstan (2016) 134 Gynaecol Obstet 
268.
74 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/apr/04/northern-irish-woman-suspended- 
sentence-self-induced-abortion, last accessed 7 August 2019.
75 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/23/supreme-court-to-hear-challenge-
to-northern-ireland-abortion-law, last accessed 17 May 2019.
76 Kitson v. Playfair (1896), The Times, 28. 
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not. It speaks with a distinctively moral voice, one that the civil law lacks.”77 
Never theless, the ultima ratio principle forms one of the central tenets of criminal 
law – the threat of punishment must be a last resort; criminal law represents the 
strong arm of the law and its use must be proportionate to the aim sought. Real 
questions arise as to whether abortion is a suitable subject for the criminal law – 
as Morris and Hawkins argue “When the criminal law invades the spheres of 
private morality and social welfare, it exceeds its proper limits… For the criminal 
law at least, man has an inalienable right to go to hell in his own fashion, provided 
he does not directly injure the person or property of another on the way. The 
criminal law is an inefficient instrument for imposing the good life on others.”78 
It is worth questioning, who is the criminal, the target of these laws? Is it the 
woman? Certainly on the campaign trail in 2016 Donald Trump said “there 
would have to be some sort of punishment for women,”79 but generally doctors, 
the “abortionists”, are targeted for punishment, rather than women who contin-
ue to be framed as victims. Nevertheless, as the cases of Sarah Catt and Purvi 
Patel80 demonstrate, where women procure their own abortion without medical 
assistance, the rhetoric is very different and the full weight of the criminal law 
is brought to bear upon them. However, the fact that women seeking or procur-
ing an abortion are labelled as deviant, that doctors are labelled as abortionists 
does nothing to protect women, or the foetus. Abortion is unlike any other area 
of health care and the fact that it is treated differently ensures that the stigma 
attached to it endures,81 access can be restricted, but the incidence of abortion 
remains largely unaffected.82 The Abortion Act and §  218a ff. StGB made abor-
tion visible and susceptible to monitoring, women were required to submit to 
closer medical control,83 but neither obviated the need for abortion. Both juris-
dictions label abortion a crime, but set out conditions where abortion is permis-
sible, emphasising that abortion is a sin and that “criminalization is necessary to 
exert overall control over pregnant women’s bodies and reproductive choices.”84 
77 A. P. Simester & A. von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of 
Criminalisation, Hart, Oxford 2011, at 5.
78 N. Morris & G. Hawkins, The Honest Politician‘s Guide to Crime Control, University 
of Chicago Press, 1972, at 2.
79 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/31/us/politics/donald-trump-abortion.html, last ac-
cessed 7 August 2019.
80 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/magazine/purvi-patel-could-be-just-the-begin-
ning.html, last accessed 7 August 2019.
81 See also R. J. Cook, Stigmatized Meanings of Criminal Abortion Law, in: Transnational 
Perspective (n 14), at 353.
82 Gilda Sedgh et al., Induced Abortion: Incidence and Trends Worldwide from 1995 to 
2008, Lancet 379, No.  9816 (2012): 625–32; World Health Organization, Safe Abortion: Tech-
nical and Policy Guidance for Health Systems, 2nd ed. (Geneva: World Health Organization, 
2012), at 23.
83 N 33, at 24.
84 R. J.Cook (n 81), at 358.
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In this way the otherness of abortion is emphasised, no other medical procedure 
is subject to the same level of regulation where detailed requirements are set out 
concerning where the procedure may be undertaken, by whom and when. These 
requirements are not dictated by medical risk, instead they are designed to un-
derline that abortion is not a standard medical procedure.85 86 The very fact that 
abortion remains a crime has a chilling effect.87 
However, it is not the case that effective regulation of abortion requires that 
it be a crime. In its first abortion decision the majority of the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht held that the minimum level of protection required for the foetus 
could only be provided by the use of the criminal law, whilst the dissenting 
judges argued that better alternatives to criminal sanctions exist and would be 
more likely to persuade her to continue the pregnancy, thereby affording the 
foetus greater protection.88 One of the significant shifts between the first and 
second abortion decisions is that the court’s majority in the latter accepted this 
argument, moving from a duty to protect the foetus that categorised the woman 
as an aggressor, to a conception that framed her as a collaborator, as someone 
whose cooperation is essential in safeguarding the foetus.89 Similarly, in Canada 
the Supreme Court struck down criminal provisions relating to abortion as 
 incompatible with the Canadian Charter of Rights, holding that “Forcing a 
woman, by threat of criminal sanction, to carry a foetus to term unless she 
meets certain criteria unrelated to her own priorities and aspirations, is a pro-
found interference with a woman’s body and thus a violation of security of the 
person.”90 The court recognised that the state could protect foetal interests and 
that use of the criminal law would not inevitably be unconstitutional, however 
it must be proportionate. 
Criminal law provides symbolic protection, but it is a symbolic protection 
that affords no real protection to foetal life, or women’s health. Although abor-
tion is a crime in both the UK and Germany it remains widely available without 
justification for social reasons, subject to women undergoing counselling, or 
obtaining the approval of two doctors, indeed in both jurisdictions the state 
pays for a significant number of these abortions! Medical abortion has blurred 
the boundaries that have dominated the law since Bourne, the distinction be-
tween the abortion performed by a medical practitioner (respected) and those 
by the non-medically qualified back street abortionist, the immoral, money in-
duced variety. The advent of medical abortion, with pills available on the inter-
85 M. Heath & E. Mulligan, Abortion in the Shadow of the Criminal Law? The Case of 
South Australia (2016) 37 Adelaide Law Review 41, at 65.
86 Part of the rationale for §  219a StGB is to prevent the normalisation and commercialisa-
tion of abortion (BT-Drucks. 7/1981 atS.  17.
87 A, B and C v. Ireland [2010] ECHR 2032.
88 BVerfGE 39, 1, at 79.
89 BVerfGE 88, 203, at 266.
90 R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30, at 56–7, per Dickson CJ.
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net, renders abortion easily accessible to those with money and a smartphone, 
so that restrictive regulation disproportionally impacts upon the vulnerable, the 
young, those lacking the financial means or the knowledge of how to acquire 
and use abortion pills safely. 
VI. Conclusion
The 50th anniversary of the Abortion Act has brought renewed focus to this area 
in England and Wales, but it has also demonstrated the stigma that still attaches 
to abortion. The 50th anniversary of the Sexual Offences Act that decriminali-
sed homosexual acts in private over the age of 21 (the age of consent has since 
been reduced) was celebrated in 2017 alongside the anniversary of the Abortion 
Act, but whilst LGBT rights were celebrated by a specially commissioned “Gay 
Britannia” season on the BBC, the BBC marked the anniversary of the Aborti-
on Act with debates about the morality of abortion,91 stressing the otherness of 
abortion. Similarly, sentencing Dr Kristina Hänel for breaching §  219a StGB by 
‘advertising’ the fact that she performs abortions on her website and setting out 
information about methods used, the judge said “The legislature does not want 
abortion to be discussed in public as though it is a normal matter.”92
The narrative of abortion as crisis continues to dominate discussions of the 
regulation of abortion, but the rhetoric employed fails to reflect the reality on 
the ground where women report certainty about their decision and relief fol-
lowing the abortion. Doctors express their frustration at the time wasted by 
requiring two signatures in England and the inability to provide reliable infor-
mation about abortion up front in Germany. It is clear that the law in both ju-
risdictions is no longer fit for purpose, written for another time when early 
medical abortion did not exist, it is unable to address the current context in 
which abortion is accessed and fails to protect women by focussing upon crim-
inalising abortion outside the medical setting rather than adopting a harm re-
ductionist approach93 that would facilitate easy access to both reliable informa-
tion and the means necessary to procure a safe abortion at home without the 
need to be counselled in order to make a responsible decision (§§  218a I, 219 
StGB), or convince two doctors that s.1(1)(a) Abortion Act applies. Importantly, 
decriminalisation does not equate with unregulated provision, abortion would 
91 S. Ditum, Not only in Ireland is there a fight to be won on abortion, The Guardian 4th 
February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/04/not-only-ireland- 
we-need-new-view-on-abortion, last accessed 7 August 2019.
92 https://www.zeit.de/wissen/gesundheit/2017-11/schwangerschaftsabbruch-aerztin- 
giessen-werbung-amtsgericht-urteil, last accessed 7 August 2019.
93 J. Erdman, Access to Information on Safe Abortion: A Harm Reduction and Human 
Rights Approach (2011) 34 Harvard Journal of Gender and the Law 413.
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not enter a legal vacuum if ss. 58–9 OAPA or §  218 were to be repealed, instead 
it would be subject to the full gamut of the laws governing any other medical 
procedure, together with professional standards.
In both Germany and the UK the criminal law has a long history of use as a 
tool to compel virtue, however it is unsuited to this role, as the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht recognised in its second abortion decision, the state needs to work 
with women if it hopes to protect foetal life, it cannot continue to treat her as an 
aggressor.94 It is suggested that whilst the state may have an interest in protect-
ing potential life, the criminalisation of abortion is neither proporotionate to 
that aim, nor effective. As Wicks has pointed out, the current regulation of 
abortion through the use of doctors (or in Germany counsellors) controlling 
access to abortion has reduced “the involvement of the criminal justice system 
in regulating terminations of pregnancy, but merely replaces the role of police, 
prosecutors and judges with members of the medical profession [or counsel-
lors]… The continued regulation of an aspect of pregnancy by means of the 
criminal law is a significant intrusion into private life and bodily autonomy.”95 
The requirement that two doctors agree that an abortion is permissible, or that 
a woman obtain a certificate stating that she has been counselled and waited the 
mandatory three days before accessing abortion serve only to infantilise wom-
en, to underline that women are judged incapable of making the decision to have 
an abortion for themselves. As Ginsburg J argued, “This way of thinking re-
flects ancient notions about women’s place in the family … ideas that have long 
since been discredited.”96
Sentencing defendants convicted of offences under the OAPA in 1931 Mc-
Cardie J said “The law of abortion as it exists ought to be substantially modi-
fied. It is out of keeping with the conditions that prevail in the world around us. 
The law as it stands does more harm than good.”97 Almost a hundred years later 
the same is true. The advent of EMA has changed the face of abortion provision 
and it is suggested that the time has come to decriminalise abortion and reframe 
it as a public health concern to be addressed through regulation outside the 
criminal law. As Jackson has suggested “The ease of DIY abortion, twen-
ty-first-century style, suggests that any further restrictions on access are likely 
to lead more women to self-medicate with potentially harmful and/or fake med-
icines. This sort of DIY abortion may look cleaner and less hazardous than the 
knitting needles of the past, but … the dangers of DIY abortion continue to 
offer a compelling public health reason for liberal abortion laws.”98 There is no 
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evidence to suggest that decriminalisation would open the floodgates to a sig-
nificant rise in abortion, abortion is widely available in both Germany and 
Great Britain, but it would change the tenor of the abortion debate, it would 
recognise women as more than the sum of their reproductive capacity, as auton-
omous agents with dignity that are acknowledged as such by the state. Wainer 
described the impact of the Abortion Law Reform Act that decriminalised 
abortion in the Australian state Victoria as causing “A profound shift in the re-
lationship between the state and its female citizens. It changes both nothing and 
everything. Nothing, because the number, rate and incidence of abortion will 
not change. And everything, because for the first time women will be recog-
nised as the authors of our own lives. With that comes our full citizenship.”99 It 
is time to recognise women in the UK and Germany as authors of our own lives 
and to relinquish the “morally loaded sledgehammer”100 of the criminal law in 
this very private sphere of life.
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